

# DNS(SEC) Views

<https://dnssecviews.net>

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# Motivation

- Securing DNS zones is fairly straight-forward
- Authoritative nameservers provide consistent data



We have been monitoring this through SecSpider (<https://secspider.net/>)

## HOWEVER

- Users rely on recursive resolvers
- Recursive resolvers follow different policies
- Timing, caching, multiple signers, etc. influence propagation
- Data from multiple sources may be combined to validate signed records
- Infrastructure providers are interested to know how their services are observed by users

That's why we built the **DNS(SEC) Views!**

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
Goal: understand how the **distributed** nature of DNS and its **eventual consistency** (temporal aspect) is observed by and affects users

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
# Use Case: Multi-Signer DNSSEC

## Common KSK Set, Unique ZSK Set per Provider



To verify correct deployment observations from various vantage points should simultaneously be collected.


## Unique KSK Set and ZSK Set per Provider




# System Overview




 **RIPE Atlas**



Database




Persist and  
query




Back End

RESTful API



Front End



Infrastructure Operator

# Approach: Collect Data

1. Find zone apex
2. Schedule regular measurements via RIPE Atlas for following records:
  - DNSKEY
  - DS
  - NS
  - SOA
3. Parse and serialize data into the DB iff:
  - Response is valid
  - Response is signed




Executed by a set of random probes (currently only US)

Also record when each probes sees which RRSet and RRSIG

# Approach: Provide Analysis

For any given zone:


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2. Color code each combination and calculate when each probe sees which combination.



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1. Calculate different combinations of *observed* DNSKEY sets and active keys in use.
2. Color code each combination and calculate when each probe sees which combination.
3. Analyze for specific events or deployment models: ongoing key transitions, multi signer DNSSEC, etc.



# Conclusion

- There is a measurable discrepancy between records at authoritative name servers and what recursive resolvers deliver
- *DNS(SEC) Views* gives operators the opportunity to follow their DNSSEC deployment from the perspective of clients in real time
- Aggregated data can be used to improve deployment practices and figure out acceptance criteria